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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS • CROSS-BORDER TRADE & ECONOMIC POLICY 7 MIN READ

What Japan's lost decades can teach Canada about its growing trade ties with China

China shows several of the warning signs Japan displayed before its long slowdown, and Canada's commodity-heavy exports to Beijing would feel the strain first. The lesson from Tokyo is that a trading partner can stay important while it stagnates, and that swapping one dominant buyer for another leaves Ottawa exposed in a different way.

BY CANUSA EDITORIAL BUREAU • PUBLISHED NOVEMBER 15, 2026
What Japan's lost decades can teach Canada about its growing trade ties with China
CANUSA News Verified Analysis Photojournalism Dispatch

Executive Summary & Key Takeaways

  • ✓Japan's property and stock bubbles burst in the early 1990s and land prices then fell for 14 straight years, with commercial land dropping to about one-third of its 1991 level.
  • ✓China's property market has declined since 2021, its population has fallen for four straight years, and its 2026 growth target of 4.5 to 5 percent is the lowest since 1991.
  • ✓Canadian energy exports to China rose about 78 percent in 2025 to roughly $9.5 billion, yet Alberta and British Columbia accounted for 92 percent of the recent growth in exports to China, so the gains stayed narrowly spread.
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1. Japan's Bubble Burst and the Long Slowdown That Followed

In the 1980s, Japan looked like the next economic superpower. Its manufacturers dominated electronics and cars, its banks ranked among the largest in the world, and many observers expected Tokyo to challenge Washington for global economic leadership within a generation. The confidence rested on soaring property and stock prices that treated endless growth as a fact of life rather than a bet on the future. Banks lent freely against rising land values, companies bought assets at prices that assumed the boom would never end, and the whole system came to depend on values that could only move in one direction.

That confidence broke in the early 1990s when Japan's property and stock-market bubbles collapsed. Land prices fell for 14 straight years, and commercial land dropped to about one-third of its 1991 level. Banks carried bad loans for years instead of writing them off, companies cut investment to repair their balance sheets, and households that had watched their wealth shrink spent less. Growth stayed weak for decades, and deflation set in as prices drifted lower year after year, which made debts heavier in real terms and gave firms one more reason to wait before spending.

Japan never collapsed, and that is part of the point. It stayed wealthy, kept its factories running, and remained a major trading partner through the whole period. The damage was slower and quieter than a crash: a long grind of weak demand, cautious firms, and lost momentum. For a country that sells into a market like that, the risk is not sudden ruin but years of shrinking orders. A buyer that stays rich yet stops growing still buys less each year, and suppliers that planned on steady growth find themselves competing for a smaller pool of orders.

2. China Shows the Same Warning Signs Japan Did

China today carries several of the markers Japan showed before its slowdown. Its property market has been in decline since 2021, and that decline has eroded household wealth while weakening the finances of local governments that relied on land sales. Its population has fallen for four straight years, and its 2026 growth target of 4.5 to 5 percent is the lowest since 1991. Trade tensions with Washington add pressure through restrictions on Chinese exports and access to advanced technologies, which hit the industries Beijing counts on for future growth.

China is not Japan in the 1990s, and the differences matter. Beijing runs a state-controlled banking system that gives it more room to absorb losses or delay restructuring than Tokyo had. China is also poorer and less urbanized than Japan was in 1990, which leaves more room for growth in household wealth and domestic consumption. It leads the world in electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels, industries Japan never had at that scale. Its relationship with Washington is also different in kind: Japan was a U.S. ally, while China is treated as a strategic rival.

Yet the size of China's population does not guarantee strong consumer demand. Household consumption sits at about 40 percent of GDP, against an OECD average of about 60 percent. In 2025, net exports accounted for about one-third of China's growth, the highest share since 1997. That leaves the economy unusually dependent on selling abroad at a moment when its largest markets are raising barriers. If foreign demand cools while households stay cautious at home, Beijing has fewer levers to pull than a country with deep domestic spending would have.

3. What a Chinese Slowdown Would Cost Canadian Exporters

Canada's exports to China are heavily concentrated in commodities, which is exactly the kind of trade that suffers when construction and factory demand cool. Energy exports rose about 78 percent in 2025 to roughly $9.5 billion as the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion opened greater overseas access, but China's oil demand is weakening. Steelmaking coal, copper, and lumber are tied closely to building and infrastructure, so they sit directly in the path of China's property downturn. When cranes stop rising in Chinese cities, Canadian resource towns feel it first.

The gains from the China trade have also been narrowly spread. Alberta and British Columbia accounted for 92 percent of the recent growth in exports to China. That concentration means a slowdown in Chinese demand would hit two provinces hard while offering little cushion elsewhere. A trade strategy built on one fast-growing buyer can look strong in the headline numbers while resting on a thin base. The national figures hide a regional bet, and the regions carrying that bet have the most to lose if Chinese demand fades.

Prime Minister Mark Carney has set a target of doubling exports to countries other than the United States over the next decade, and China is an obvious part of that plan. The United States still accounts for over 70 percent of Canadian goods exports, and China is already Canada's second-largest trading partner, with about $125 billion of two-way merchandise trade in 2025. The question is whether more trade with Beijing reduces risk or simply moves it. Diversification that swaps one dominant buyer for another leaves Ottawa with the same exposure under a different flag.

4. Dependence Is a Political Problem, Not Just a Trade Problem

Japan learned that deep trade ties do not guarantee steady access. In the 1980s, Washington pressured Tokyo to open its markets, and Japanese carmakers such as Honda and Toyota answered by building plants across North America, with factories in Ontario. In 2025, Japan pledged US$550 billion in American investment to resolve tariff disputes with President Donald Trump. The commercial relationship survived because it ran in both directions and rested on shared security interests. Trade backed by a common alliance proved more durable than trade built on volume alone.

China has shown it will use market access as leverage. During a 2010 territorial dispute, Japanese businesses reported that Chinese shipments of rare earth minerals had stopped. Japan responded by diversifying and cut China's share of its rare earth imports from about 90 percent to between 60 and 70 percent. Canada had a similar experience after imposing 100 percent tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024: China retaliated with tariffs on canola, and Canadian exports to China fell 62 percent. The pattern is consistent across both cases: access that is granted for political reasons can be withdrawn for the same reasons.

A deal reached in January lowered canola tariffs in exchange for allowing 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles into Canada each year at a 6.1 percent tariff. The episode shows how quickly access can be granted or withdrawn when one side holds the buying power. Canada's priority should be to widen its customer base: its Pacific coast can ship crude, gas, and critical minerals across Asia, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership gives Canada preferential access to Japan and other Indo-Pacific markets. The goal is to ensure that no single partner can set the terms.

Frequently Asked Questions & Strategic Guidance

What were Japan's lost decades?

Japan's property and stock-market bubbles burst in the early 1990s after a decade in which Japan was widely expected to challenge the United States for economic leadership. Land prices then fell for 14 straight years, with commercial land dropping to about one-third of its 1991 level, and growth stayed weak for decades as banks, firms, and households worked through the damage.

Why is Canada turning toward China for trade?

Facing tariffs and a deteriorating trade relationship with the United States, which still takes over 70 percent of Canadian goods exports, Prime Minister Mark Carney has set a target of doubling exports to countries other than the U.S. over the next decade. China is already Canada's second-largest trading partner, with about $125 billion of two-way merchandise trade in 2025.

How exposed are Canadian exports to a Chinese slowdown?

Exports to China are heavily concentrated in commodities. Energy exports rose about 78 percent in 2025 to roughly $9.5 billion, yet steelmaking coal, copper, and lumber are tied to construction and infrastructure, so they are exposed to China's property downturn. Alberta and British Columbia accounted for 92 percent of the recent growth in exports to China.

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